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Abstract Leibniz’s Theodicy can and should be read otherwise than a naive statement of metaphysi-
cal optimism. To make this point, the Author revives some suggestions by Deleuze and contrasts them 
with Heidegger’s critical reading of Leibniz’s rationalism. Leibniz neither defends God simply by as-
serting his innocence, nor affirms that bad events are merely an unpleasant, human dream. Just as in 
Bach’s Art of Fugue every chord is repeated in multiple tonalities, in Leibniz’s universe each event is a 
moment of an infinite rational web. The best of all possible worlds is not ‘perfect’, as its harmony and 
order are not free from dissonances; but each dissonant chord of reality is ‘well-tempered’ through 
its infinite relations to all the other chords and tonalities. Two conclusions follow: that Leibniz’s view 
is a powerful antidote for any childish humanistic anthropomorphism; and that his teleology is in no 
need of progress. The best of all possible worlds is actually the world in which we live.
Summary 1 No Arbitrariness. – 2 The Non Correctibility of the Universe as It Is. – 3 Concordia 
Discors.
Keywords Evil. Arbitrariness. Counterpoint.
The beginning of The Book of Job (1, 6-7) reads as follows:
Now there was a day when the sons of God came to present themselves 
before the Lord, and Satan came also among them. And the Lord said 
unto Satan, Whence comest thou? Then Satan answered the Lord, and 
said, From going to and fro in the earth, and from walking up and down 
in it.
The first one who asks the question ‘Where does evil come from if God ex-
ists?’ is, therefore, God Himself; moreover, He is not speaking to something 
that is totally alien to Himself. Perhaps, His inquiring into a provenance 
reveals some sort of surprise or unease, but all the questions of Theodicy 
originate from here: from the proximity and reciprocal intimacy between 
God and evil, from their compossibility.
Article translated by Susanna Zinato.
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Among His sons God finds Satan, too, and when He asks the latter 
‘where do you come from?’ they understand each other completely. They 
speak the same language. It is by starting from that original intimacy, the 
one shared by a father and his son, by a creator and his creature, that the 
question about the provenance evokes a distance, a non-total identity. God 
is not making enquiries about a possible, non-actual world; He is not asking 
Satan the name of a place unknown to Himself. In point of fact, Satan’s 
answer is of no short or partial range: ‘from the earth’. Here, certainly, the 
distance between the creator’s height and His creation’s lowness or infe-
riority is voiced, but the earth’s distance does not annihilate its proximity 
to God, who has created and given life to it: therefore God is interrogating 
Himself about that material He Himself has planned and generated, as if 
He were turning towards a son He has not seen for a long time, finding his 
face is deformed. Satan does not answer by indicating a specific point of 
the earth and of creation. There is no specific damned place: of it it would 
be enough to beware. It could be enclosed and avoided. The whole earth 
is scoured throughout by Satan.1 The very creation willed and judged by 
God as ‘the best possible’ is, at the same time, in its infinity, bed of imper-
fection, sorrow, injustice.
Struck by a myriad of undeserved blows, Job will raise vehement words 
to proclaim his clean conscience with complete honesty and, above all, 
to get an answer from that God to Whom he has been, is and will remain 
faithful. Job’s friends intervene by only worrying about using arguments 
that may be useful for ingratiating themselves with God, as if addressing 
a monarch yearning for being ascribed all the most perfect attributes, first 
of all goodness and, together with it, might.
In the end, God answers the call of that man overwhelmed by an un-
deserved unhappiness and the latter will keep silent at last, not because 
he will have acknowledged that God is good anyhow, but, rather, because 
he will put himself in the hands of His omnipotent, majestic sovereignty. 
Worthwhile remarking is that God prefers Job to the latter’s friends, get-
ting enraged with them and sparing them only because Job has asked Him 
not to punish them.
In the essay On the Miscarriage of all Trials on Theodicy (1791) Kant 
pays homage to Job’s sincerity (Aufrichtigkeit) and honesty (Redlichkeit), 
to Job’s addressing God directly, showing no servile fear, which lays him 
open to the risk of pronouncing excessive words, but which demonstrates 
an authentic and sincere relationship of faith.
1 Cf. Théodicée, § 274: «And the great Dragon was cast out, that old serpent, called the 
Devil […]: he was cast out into the earth, and his angels were cast out with him» (Rev. Xii. 
7,8,9).
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Job’s friends [say that they consider…] all ills in the world […] as so many 
punishments for crimes committed; […] Job [instead] declares himself 
for the system of unconditional divine decision. «He has decided», Job 
says, «He does as he wills». […] Job speaks as he thinks, and with the 
courage with which he, as well as every human being in his position, 
can well afford; his friends, on the contrary, speak as if […] gaining his 
[God’s] favor through their judgment were closer to their heart than 
the truth […]. God [in answering Job…] allowed him glimpses into the 
beautiful side of creation, […] but also, by contrast, into the horrible 
side, by calling out to him the products of his might, among which also 
harmful and fearsome things, each of which appears […] as destructive, 
counterpurposive, and incompatible with a universal plan established 
with goodness and wisdom. […] before any court of dogmatic theologi-
ans […] Job would have likely suffered a sad fate. Hence only sincerity of 
heart and not distinction of insight […] are the attributes [appreciated] 
before God. (Kant 1996, pp. 32-33)
A long and famous passage, here reproposed as a springboard for a few 
questions. Is the Leibniz of Theodicy only the nth ‘friend of Job’, dogmatic 
and moralistic, who, in proclaiming that God «deserves» our love and that 
we feel «animated by a zeal such as cannot fail to please Him» (Théodicée, 
§ 6, GP VI, p. 106),2 does not even appear to be exempt from flattering 
apology?
I also wonder whether the image of Leibniz as of a Christian Pythago-
ras who stages one of the most cumbersome chapters of metaphysical 
optimism really is a reading that gives him his due or, anyway, whether it 
is a fruitful interpretation nowadays. Besides, according to Leibniz him-
self, «once penetrated into the bottom of things, it is possible to see how 
almost any theoretical point of view has its own truth» (Tomasi 2002, 
p. 12, our transl.). Which is, then, Leibniz’s truth? I will attempt to use 
a definitely unrestrained statement, to propose a few first notes for a 
Leibnizdicy. Of course it is difficult to put between brackets the fact that 
Leibniz introduces himself as, first of all, «God’s attorney» (Stewart 2006, 
chap. 5) – «because it is the cause of God I plead» (Théodicée, Préface, 
GP VI, p. 38) – driven, «in a submissive and zealous spirit», by the «intent 
to sustain and exalt the glory of God» by defending him from the charge 
of being unjust (Théodicée, Discours, § 81, GP VI, p. 97). Having said that 
the explicitly apologetic intent is linked with an untenable optimism, still, 
the easy way in which we wave this reservation should put us on the alert. 
2 I follow Huggard’s translation (cf. Leibniz 1952).
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Leibniz himself denounces as stale and alleged the depth of those who are 
pessimists by profession, in the ways of old Silenus caught by King Midas 
and of his «allegedly beautiful statement (prétendue belle sentence)», ac-
cording to which «the first and the greatest of goods was not to be born, 
and the second, to depart from this life with dispatch» (Théodicée, § 260, 
GP VI, p. 271). Hastingly repeating the same old story of the ills of the 
world and taking it for granted is self-referential in an unacceptable, some-
how puerile, way. That is the mistake of those who figure to themselves 
that «Nature was made for them only, and that they hold of no account 
what is separate from their person; whence they infer that when some-
thing unpleasing to them occurs all goes ill in the universe» (Théodicée, 
§ 262, GP VI, p. 273). Put bluntly, Leibniz also helps us to outdistance that 
cliché handed down to us according to which whoever shows a positive 
appreciation of the world is guilty of foolish or naïve optimism, whereas 
whoever denounces the ills of the earth, injustice and the imperfection of 
the human nature, is deep and sensitive. In order to avoid misunderstand-
ings, it must be said that I would actually find it very difficult to sail into 
the eulogy of the perfections of creation,3 yet I understand very well the 
Leibnizian unmasking of the excessive anthropocentric easiness indulged 
in when one fully poses – not only in philosophy – as suffering and deep 
accuser of the wickedness and woe in the world. I wonder, then, whether 
the label ‘metaphysical optimism’ might not turn out to be inappropriate, 
at least when it coincides with that nice tale for naïve and ever-edifying 
thinkers mocked by Voltaire’s Candide.
Besides, the core of the considerations I am putting forth is the fol-
lowing: according to Leibniz, ‘best’ does not mean ‘perfect’; ‘possible’ 
(at least with regard to God) does not equal to ‘necessary’; ‘calculable’ 
does not simply correspond to ‘logistic’; and, above all, ‘harmonic’ is not 
equivalent to ‘clear of dissonances’, and, when coinciding with ‘ordered’, 
it does so only in a peculiarly baroque sense, that is, with the meaning of 
alive, multiform, variously inflected, and vibrant with spiritual active force.
A little acid, sharpness or bitterness is often more pleasing than sugar; 
shadows enhance colours; and even a dissonance in the right place 
(placée où il faut) gives relief to harmony. We wish to be terrified by 
rope-dancers on the point of falling and we wish that tragedies shall 
well-nigh cause us to weep. Do men relish health enough, or thank God 
enough for it, without having ever been sick? And is it not most often 
necessary that a little evil render the good more discernible, that is to 
say, greater? (Théodicée, § 12, GP VI, p. 109)
3 «His [Leibniz’s] harmonia praestabilita is miraculous and contradicts the daily experi-
ence of all mankind», Newton to Conti, 26th Feb. 1716, in Leibniz, Clarke [1956] 1998, p. 186.
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Moreover, in attempting to understand and, so, justify this Leibnizian 
position, thus also accepting the equation between knowing and justi-
fying – against which Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, will put the 
distinction between quid facti and quid iuris –, I do not even mean to 
ignore the considerations most cherished by the contemporary thought. 
Explanations and justifications add an annoying, both intellectualistic and 
moralistic, superstructure to suffering and to moral evil, be it committed 
or endured. In spite of this, Leibnizian metaphysics appears as a design 
that, though sidereally distant and untenable, does not seem as simply 
to be reducible to the charge of being short-sighted or theoretically in-
sensitive. This Leibnizian reason, even as ratio sufficiens, certainly is an 
interweaving of logical and causal relationships of the being in its totality, 
but it is a beautifully resonant «linking together (enchaînement) of truths» 
(Théodicée, Discours, § 1, 62, 64; GP VI, pp. 49, 84, 86), arousing sensible 
pleasures that join the pleasures of the mind engendered by knowledge of 
rational connections (cf. Théodicée, § 254). According to Leibniz, all this 
inflames with love rational creatures and their knowing, penetrating as 
much as patient, intelligence. Well, I would say that the Leibnizian love 
for the real world is not reduced to a theological reflex, a ‘due’ effect, 
aprioristically deduced from a faith position or, worse, from a doctrinal 
hypostasis. That is why, then, all this can be handed down to us, even leav-
ing out of consideration the reference to God or the excessive theoretical 
enthusiasm for the logical-rational linking that keeps the things of the 
universe together.
1 No Arbitrariness 
It is hard to meet a more distant interpreter of Leibniz than Martin Hei-
degger (cf. Cristin 1998), still the latter’s reflections decisively contrib-
ute to effectively focus upon one of the structural features of Leibnizian 
thought: the exclusion of arbitrariness in whatever happens in the real 
world. Heidegger shares Leibniz’s target and for this reason his journey 
necessarily cuts across Leibniz’s onto-theological moves, even while radi-
cally questioning them. Of course, the heterogeneity between the sharp 
philosophical intelligence of a Swabian farmer and the ingenious logical-
mathematical intellect of a baroque scientist remains unbridgeable, as 
much unbridgeable as the gap between the existential sensitivity of the 
first, whose aprioris are this world and the earth, and the theological 
sensitivity of the latter, for whom there is no thought or perception that 
can avoid the lens of the Christian faith in God the good and wise creator.
Certainly, every time Heidegger – as in the Postscript to ‘What is Me-
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taphysics?’ (1943-1949) – encloses Leibniz’s moves within the label of 
modern ‘calculative thinking’, he misses the target. Heidegger does not 
appear as being either interested in or receptive towards a rationality, like 
Leibniz’s baroque one, that can be simultaneously logical-mathematical 
computation and harmonic and musical warp, or animated and variegated 
weaving of the universe. Heidegger and, too often, many of us, in the 
Baroque can only see the artifice of the mannerist frills or the forced for-
malism of the mathematical algorithm, almost superstitious in its claiming 
it is telling us ‘the everything’ of the world. To the twentieth-century-
Heideggerian sensitivity logic is nothing but ‘logistics’, a merely technical, 
as much correct as truthless, inflection of thought.
The vivid, concrete and, so, true aspect of Leibnizian logic meant as 
effective design of God, as infinitely articulated, connective weaving that 
illuminates, unifies, and disseminates truth among the things of the world4 
remains, to the Heideggerian viewer, a mere episode of the metaphysical 
oblivion of the truth of being. 
As is well known, Martin Heidegger concentrates the whole of his philo-
sophical attention on a Leibnizian passage that occurs in the seventh sec-
tion of the Principles of Nature and Grace Based on Reason (1714):
Why is there something rather than nothing (Pourquoi il y a plutôt 
quelque chose que rien)? After all, nothing is simpler and easier than 
something. Also, given that things have to exist, we must be able to give 
a reason why they have to exist as they are and not otherwise.
Heidegger finds exemplarily metaphysical that to Leibniz nothing is only 
a void of being, a mere nothingness, insignificantly simple. All the philo-
sophical-onto-theological wonder, on the contrary, arises at the presence 
of something of being that stands out on this nothingness, overcoming 
and suppressing it.5 Why is there something in this void? Which substance 
capable of action has put it there? Referring back to the biblical God as 
first cause is the great, all-founding principle that explains and makes us 
understand and admire the infinite chain of things. 
Neglecting, here, the reasons that led Heidegger to evoke the role of 
foundation and groundness, at the same time, of nothing meant as non-
4 Yet Leibniz would never agree to think of God as of the world soul (cf. Théodicée, § 195). 
5 In fact, once the act of creation has occurred, the nothing as empty nothingness disap-
pears: «to admit a vacuum in nature, is ascribing to God a very imperfect work: ‘tis violating 
the grand principle of the necessity of a sufficient reason; […] all is full. […] matter is more 
perfect than a vacuum, […] then there must be no vacuum at all; for the perfection of mat-
ter is to that of a vacuum, as something to nothing», Mr. Leibniz’s Fourth Paper, in Leibniz, 
Clarke [1956] 1998, p. 44. Cf. Leibniz, Principles of Nature and Grace Based on Reason, § 3 
(GP VI, pp. 598-599).
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being and, so, as ‘Being’ (‘Sein’ as no-thing), the point at which his consid-
erations become precious with respect to Leibniz is not where the author 
of What is Metaphysics? and, above all, of The Principle of Reason (1957) 
denounces the pervasive monopoly of the causality principle. Although 
Heidegger is not a thinker who articulates confutations to correct others’ 
mistakes, his questioning could be summed up in these terms: Leibniz’s 
mistake lies not in thinking that it is always possible to find a reason why; 
on the contrary, it lies in thinking that, where a sufficient reason is not 
determinable, only the arbitrariness of being as insignificant casualness 
would burst open. As above all inferable from the fifth and sixth lectures 
of The Principle of Reason, the Heideggerian lunge is radical: the meta-
physical oblivion does not lie in presuming to drive everything back to 
one reason why, but in maintaining the contingency of the world. In point 
of fact, Leibniz causalistically embanks arbitrariness but in order to seal 
the very contingency of being meant as dependent on the divine cause. 
Heidegger collides with Leibniz and delivers the latter up to the meta-
physical inability to remain faithful to Being’s character of event (Erei-
gnis), which is neither arbitrary nor contingent; yet, by so doing, he also 
offers a precious contribution to our understanding of the truth force of the 
Leibnizian thought. This exceeds the extension of the causality principle 
and even the reduction to sufficient reason of the foundation. By stating 
that «there is nothing casual in the world, if not out of our ignorance, since 
deep causes remain hidden to us» (Provisional Thoughts Concerning the 
Use and Improvement of the German Language, § 50, 1697, published 
1714), Leibniz is not simply subsuming Being within the causalistic pigeon-
holes,6 neither is he only engaged in rejecting the idea of a tyrant God 
whose will is whimsical and despotic (cf. Théodicée, Préface; Discours, 
§ 2, 6). The truth force of Leibniz’s philosophy reaches down to us as it 
anyway rejects the arbitrariness of evil, by considering it as integral part 
of life, co-essential to it. 
Leibniz does assimilate evil to darkness and to ignorance, that is, to «a 
certain kind of privation», the cause of which is, so, deficiens (Théodicée, 
§ 32-33; GP VI, pp. 121-122), but he appears to keep far from the definitely 
more abstract and metaphysical attempts of those who, Augustine-like, 
only worry about depriving evil of any ontological reality so as to be able, 
in this way, to absolve God.7 
6 In quoting the beautiful lines by Giuseppe Scaligero, «Ne curiosus quaere causas om-
nium», Leibniz himself allows that the obsessive rational asking for a reason why can favour 
the adversary’s game: when our inadequacy will prevent us from determining the cause, 
the adversary will exult as he will infer from it the blindness of God’s will (Théodicée, Dis-
cours, § 56, GP VI, p. 81). 
7 «For to say that God is not the author of sin, because he is not the author of a privation, 
although he can be called the author of everything that is real and positive in the sin – that 
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According to Leibniz the world is contingent but bad things are inscribed 
in the necessary plot of life. In Leibniz’s view evil is no mere collateral 
effect of the creation of good. He does not say: God has deemed a good 
thing to create light and, so, human beings have to suffer shadows, too, 
‘cold’ and ‘unpleasant’ consequences (by inertial necessity) of the pres-
ence of light (cf. Théodicée, § 209). His perspective, on the contrary, is 
more pregnant: imperfection, suffering and criminal deeds are integral 
part, if only as species of privations, of the web of relationships that forms 
the truth of the whole creation. Evil is no exception, nor arbitrary or casual 
suspension of the ordinary goodness of the universe, but is an essential 
part of this unique actual world without which the latter would not be 
‘the best possible’. However much this may trouble our contemporary 
philosophers’ hypersensitivity with respect to disharmony, Leibniz tells 
us about a composite universe that is not viable only starting from above 
(God, faith, eternal truths), analytically and aprioristically, downwards (the 
world, knowledge, perception, pleasure, suffering). Evil is everywhere and 
yet, in being wisely sewn together with the other parts, it helps make this 
world lovable and worthwhile living, to the extent that, if one does not 
halt at those tesserae of the mosaic that are badly-made, he/she rejoices 
with intelligence and passion at the whole weaving of this actual universe, 
acknowledging the prevailing in it of the harmonic result. Let’s be clear, 
Leibniz’s is a theodicy, not a cosmodicy, as Nietzsche would have it, still 
what in his reasonings turns out to be philosophically strong and original 
to us is his vision not of the creator but of the existing reality, the actual 
world with respect to which reason and experience, cognitive love and 
patience, beauty and harmony are, marvellously, one.
2 The Non Correctibility of the Universe as It Is
The hyper-articulated Leibnizian labyrinth appears to make itself valu-
able exactly by virtue of its revisiting, in fully modern times, medieval 
legacies that, with no solution of continuity, are nonetheless merged with 
the new sense of nature acquired through physics as a science. These are 
years in which European philosophy is elaborating the idea of progress, 
around which the modern project of improvement and correction of the 
world can be developed, yet Leibniz puts himself outside of the princi-
ple of the world’s perfectibility, especially the one of anthropocentric-
humanistic orientation.
is a manifest illusion. It is a leftover from the visionary philosophy of the past; it is a subter-
fuge (un faux-fuyant) with which a reasonable person will never be satisfied» (The Author 
of Sin [1673?], in Leibniz 2005, pp. 150, 110-111).
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No more am I able to approve of the opinion of certain modern writ-
ers who boldly maintain that which God has made is not perfect in the 
highest degree, and that he might have done better. […] To show that 
an architect could have done better is to find fault with his work. […] 
Their [sc. modern thinkers’] opinion is, in my judgment, unknown to 
the writers of antiquity and is a deduction based upon the too slight ac-
quaintance which we have with the general harmony of the universe and 
with the hidden reasons for God’s conduct. In our ignorance, therefore, 
we are tempted to decide audaciously that many things might have been 
done better. (Leibniz [1686] 1924, § 3)
The glorification of God’s supreme wisdom is not only the key for defending 
«the objective goodness of the world» from those modern conceptions that 
reduce good and evil to «human needs and preferences» (Wilson 2011). 
Leibniz attacks those who hold that God «could have done better» (Théodi-
cée, § 168, GP VI, p. 211).8 In point of fact, this equals to «setting bounds to 
the goodness and the perfection of God» (§ 193-194, p. 231). Here one can 
see the resurfacing of the weighty Thomistic paradigm to which Leibniz is 
indebted for the claimed and indissoluble conjuction in God of might, will, 
and wisdom.9 Aquinas, as a medieval thinker, does exclude any proportion 
between the finite creatural and the infinite divine, whereas, on the con-
trary, Leibniz is modern in his thinking that the divine choice finds sufficient 
reasons by taking into account the created world (cf. Théodicée, § 79) and, 
so, exactly like Malebranche, is walking the way of the commensurability to 
God of the finite world, in contrast with the Thomistic theology (cf. Scribano 
2003, p. 179). Saint Thomas, however, lays the foundations for Leibniz’s 
teleological thinking without admitting, as the modern do, of the correct-
ibility of the universe. Thomistically, the universe as it is cannot be better, 
in that God has always done everything in the best way, but as all-mighty 
He could make things better, things which, therefore, would constitute a 
better universe. Leibniz keeps close to Saint Thomas with regard to many 
aspects,10 though he does not worry, as the latter does, about pointing out 
8 Emanuela Scribano has shown how, here, Leibniz’s adversary is not Malebranche, as is 
usually maintained, but Suarez, who, in his Disputationes Metaphysicae, is anxious about 
safeguarding, first of all, divine omnipotence and freedom of indifference (cf. Théodicée, 
§ 199): God can therefore improve even the most perfect thing (cf. Scribano 2003, pp. 166, 
169, 173).
9 Cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Prima pars, Question 25, art. 5, Reply 
to Objection 1: «In God, power and essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one 
and the same».
10 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Prima pars, Question 25, art. 3: «I answer 
that […] «God can do all things» is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things 
that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent. […] whatever implies 
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the unfolding of the divine might much beyond the created nature but, 
rather, takes care to show the reciprocal interpenetration of God’s wisdom, 
His excellent choices, and the physical order of nature.
Multiform and inclusive of infinite variety to the extent of risking dis-
persiveness, the Leibnizian mirror takes possession of the most advanced 
feature of modern physical-mathematical scientificalness. However, this 
is done without falling prey to the dawning progressive philosophies of 
history obsessed with the now violent now morally edifying task of improv-
ing the world. Perhaps it was a question of consistency with the theologi-
cal faith in an omnipotent wise and good creator, who cannot but have 
created a world that already is the possible best and, therefore, is in 
no need of corrections. Perhaps it was a peculiar and untimely medieval 
legacy, but the point is that Leibniz has got the strength of being of value 
nowadays, provided we leave out the reference to God, and of reaching 
us, who are now disenchanted as to any hypothesis of progress or any 
naïve anthropocentrism. An unrelinquishable Leibnizian refrain that we 
cannot abandon underlines the defectiveness, confusion, and partiality of 
our representations of the world. «The lazy ones are always in a hurry».11 
Those who are suffering from mental laziness come too soon to a halt in 
their reasonings and knowledge, and, so, are inclined to make rash judg-
ments. In tackling events that bring suffering or moral indignation they 
advance judgments formed on their own perspective, often on their own 
ignorance, too, moreover presuming that they can measure the whole by 
starting from their personal negative experience. 
You have known the world only since the day before yesterday, you see 
scarce farther than your nose, and you carp at the world. Wait until you 
know more of the world and consider therein especially the parts which 
present a complete whole (as do organic bodies); and you will find there 
a contrivance and a beauty transcending all imagination. […] We find 
in the universe some things which are not pleasing to us; but let us be 
aware that it is not made for us alone. It is nevertheless made for us if 
we are wise. (Théodicée, § 194, GP VI, p. 232)
Those who are patient in reasoning and cognitively penetrating the things 
of the world get a wider, more articulate, that is, truer, vision than the one 
hastily obtained through self-referential, partial, and ignorant judgments. 
The man of knowledge receives joy from his patient and wise investigat-
contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have 
the aspect of possibility». See, for istance, Théodicée, § 226-227.
11 «Pigros semper festinare» (De scientia universali seu calculo philosophico, in Leibniz 
1860, XI, p. 84). 
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ing – and, perhaps, the present contribution could have been entitled: An 
«overmastering joy founded on reason» and knowledge (§ 257, p. 269; cf. 
§ 254),12 rather than: The infinite patience of reasoning.
If Leibniz keeps on enthralling philosophers that is because he is pro-
posing a radical questioning of any banally humanistic progression. His 
moves are certainly soaked with faith and Christian theology, but their 
logical-mathematical, scientific, and physical approach keeps on address-
ing those who relate themselves to the universe without establishing as 
unit of measurement their own small perspective and, at the same time, 
take care not to deny evil or, worse, not to make of it an irrelevant oc-
currence in a perfect universe. All this goes well together with an idea of 
universe that becomes experience of it as a network of links and laws of 
nature, with no holes or weak meshes. From this point of view quite sig-
nificant is Leibniz’s position with respect to miracles and mysteries, in that 
it effectively exemplifies, thus helping us understand it, how the physical-
scientific approach not ‘in spite of’ but exactly ‘owing to’ its being soaked 
with Christian theology excludes the correctibility of the existing world.
According to Leibniz, God has pre-formed and pre-established the or-
der of things in a supernatural way, foreseeing and choosing the best and 
the most convenient one. Once the «original constitution» of things has 
been set out in this way all the others, even the new organisms, follow, 
as «a mechanical consequence of a preceding organic constitution», that 
is, according to the laws of nature (Théodicée, Préface, GP VI, p. 41). In 
one move Leibniz succeeds in setting up a scientific-rational and physical 
view of nature and, at the same time, in rendering superfluous human ap-
peals to God’s perpetual miracles.13 Of course the Creator’s omnipotence 
entails that He may perform miracles as acts of grace, but the decisive 
point is the following: the world created by God is a clock in no need of 
being mended. The harmony of the universe is not the effect of a perpetual 
miracle through which God would providentially come to mend the series 
of things. Conceding that would mean making of God an awkward and 
improvident architect always ready to intervene in order to fix the build-
ing poorly planned and defectively carried out by Himself (cf. Théodicée, 
12 In Leibniz’s view the best way to know God is by scientifically knowing the created 
world, that is nature, and, when man knows it, he will love God. Though Leibniz sees 
only a difference of degree between the theological-religious moment and the cognitive-
experiential moment, the wealth of indications articulated in the second is such that his 
philosophizing nourishes his love for the world even independently of his relationship of 
faith with its creator. 
13 Besides, miracles and mysteries are not ‘against reason’, but ‘above reason’, that is 
incomprehensible to the human reason, which is limited and partial (cf. Antognazza 2011, 
pp. 233-235).
224 Paltrinieri. Justifying Leibniz, or the Infinite Patience of Reasoning
Theodicy and Reason, pp. 213-234
§ 53).14 Moreover, the question that might be put forth is: those who think 
or hope – praying to this end15 – that God may intervene with providential 
miracles are not disparaging the creation and its creator? If, then, as 
already pointed out, the Leibnizian directions are able to go beyond the 
horizon of faith, one can reformulate the question: are those who are hope-
fully waiting for exceptional happenings to suspend the laws of natural 
reality, by bringing improvements and corrections in human life, only the 
most unhappy of men or, also, are they the most incapable of loving and un-
derstanding this world they do necessarily belong to?16 It is here – it won’t 
escape my readers’ attention – that an unexpected convergence between 
reciprocally remote thinkers such as Leibniz and Heidegger can emerge.
On attempting a rereading of the phrase proposed by Heidegger in Iden-
tity and Difference (1957) one could say that more than an onto-theo-logy 
Leibniz’s is an ‘onto-teleo-logy’ where, however, ‘teleology’ rhymes with 
‘Entelechy’ (Théodicée, § 87, GP VI, p. 150) and ‘harmonic development’, 
and not with ‘progress of the perfectible’. Leibniz, in fact, admits of the 
gradual transformation of things which can, therefore, improve, thus tele-
ologically unfolding and completing their essence. And since every single 
part is linked with all the others, the progress of a single substance will 
entail a progress of the whole universe (cf. § 202). Still, the infinite weav-
ing of the universe or, better, the infinite weavings (in the plural) of the 
universe constitute a harmony that, even when bringing better futures, 
does not pave the way to any progressive proto-philosophy of history. Suf-
fered evil does not improve anything, nor make it progress. Simply, it is 
part of the best world; the imperfect or painful parts combine in the best 
way, first in God’s intellect and then in the actual creatural realization. 
The best of all possible systems «is precisely the plan of the universe as it 
14 «I maintain it [the creation] to be a watch, that goes without wanting to be mended by 
him: otherwise we must say, that God bethinks himself again. No; God has foreseen every 
thing; he has provided a remedy for every thing before-hand; there is in his works a harmony, 
a beauty, already pre-established» (Mr. Leibiz’s Second Paper, § 8, in Leibniz, Clarke [1956] 
1998, p. 18). «The harmony […] is not a perpetual miracle; but the effect or consequence 
of an original miracle, worked at the creation of things; as all natural things are. Though 
indeed it is a perpetual wonder, as many natural things are» (Mr. Leibniz’s Fifth Paper, § 89, 
in The Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, 85).
15 «[Bayle says] that those who pray to God hope for some change in the order of nature; 
but it seems as though, according to his opinion, they are mistaken. […] Indeed, if they 
receive succour from good angels there will be no change in the general order of things» 
(Théodicée, Remarques sur le Livre de l’origine du mal, § 27, GP VI, p. 433).
16 «It is only people of a malicious disposition (gens d’un naturel malin) or those who 
have become somewhat misanthropic through misfortunes, like Lucian’s Timon, who find 
wickedness everywhere, and who poison the best actions by the interpretations they give 
to them» (Théodicée, § 220, GP VI, p. 249).
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is» (§ 225, p. 252). There is nothing to be corrected or mended.17 Leibniz’s 
is a teleological in-motion photography of the world. The best is here and 
now, and it is exactly this very world that we are given to live.18 
3 Concordia Discors
God is not harmonic. He is the sum of all perfections, the reason of univer-
sal harmony, but He Himself is not harmonic. Harmony only springs from 
the unifying relation among opposites, harmony is of the real world and 
is the result of the reciprocal joining together of good and bad things, of 
consonances and dissonances.
God has willed a world in which evil had to be not because He wished 
for evil but because He has judged that ills, included in the intercon-
nection of the whole, contribute to make the latter the best possible (cf. 
Théodicée, § 204, 225, 350). «All is connected (lié) in God’s great design» 
(§ 118, p. 168) and each single part acquires sense, value, and truth only 
within that infinite connective weaving that in the divine intellect is com-
pletely distinct idea. Even the most beautiful thing, however, if we detach 
and isolate a part of it, this, reduced to a disconnected ‘piece’, will quite 
possibly appear to us both ugly and devoid of any sense (cf. § 213). In the 
same way, if we are not patient enough to outdistance our own perspective 
from evil, as when we get too close to a painting, our eyes are invaded 
by blots of colour and by the imperfections of the canvas, and we become 
unable to grasp and, even less, to appreciate that painting in its entirety.19
Leibniz resumes the word of Greek origin ‘Harmony’,20 to testify how 
the whole is a mathematically-ordered composition (cf. Théodicée, § 242), 
made of contrasts and, also, constitutively beautiful.
Order, fundamentally logical and rational, can, in fact, arouse both intel-
lectual pleasure in those who are able to know it (cf. § 254), and aesthetic-
17 «God cannot do the impossible». A project for a better world? Impossible. Had it been 
possible, «God would have preferred it» (Théodicée, § 226, GP VI, p. 253). 
18 I am well aware that this is in keeping with some Thomistic positions that are dear to 
that part of the Catholic tradition that tries to contain, if not to exclude, any active, autono-
mous, and responsible intervention on man’s part, for example in the bioethical field. While 
definitely not sharing this approach, I find, anyway, that it is philosophically necessary to 
come to grips with the challenge coming from this non progressive paradigm which, in 
point of fact, is tenable independently of positions of faith or ethical-naturalistic hypostases. 
19 Cf. Théodicée, § 147, GP VI, p. 198: «The apparent deformities of our little worlds com-
bine to become beauties in the great world».
20 Cf. Heraclitus, Diels-Kranz Fragment 8 (from Aristoteles, Nicomachean Ethics, 1155b): 
«it is what opposes that helps and from different tones comes the fairest tune (εκ τῶν 
διαφερόντων καλλίστην αρμονίαν)» (Plato, Timaeus, 31c-36b, 80a-b).
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sensible pleasure in those who rely on perception and imagination. Reality 
is structured according to hierarchies and priorities in which mathematics 
plays a supporting role, still it is a labyrinth that we cross, however incom-
pletely, also through the perceptive and aesthetic representations which, 
therefore, are not reducible to a merely subjective question, nor to illusions 
or falsities. Though beauty entails a subjective reception, it is, at the same 
time, objective manifestation of the good order of the universe (cf. § 146). 
The Leibnizian Baroque – ante litteram – tries to avoid any ‘aesthetistic’ 
reduction of the aesthetic dimension and, by embracing motifs that are 
not exclusively Platonic, keeps the objective anchoring of beauty safe (cf. 
Tomasi 2002, pp. 61-63, 99, 176).
In Confessio philosophy Leibniz had resumed a very traditional mean-
ing of harmony as unitary composing of the opposites as «Similarity in 
variety, that is, diversity compensated by identity».21 One gets intellectual 
pleasure from the order that unifies opposed and contrary things, but it 
is a harmonizing involving the aesthetic dimension, too. This meaning of 
‘harmony’, on the other hand, is destined to become wondrously compli-
cated, fed by paradigms that are still philosophical-theological and, in 
particular, baroque.
Leibniz often proposes, at least at neuralgic points, in his long reflection 
on the ills of the world, musical references and examples. We would miss 
the point if we took them as simply explicative similes of aesthetic type. 
In point of fact, Leibniz throws a bridge between the medieval meaning 
of music and the one characterizing baroque theology and aesthetics. In 
the Middle Ages ‘musica’ stands for ‘musica theorica’ and it is science and 
doctrine of the ratios and proportions, a wider domain than music, placed 
anyway among the mathematical sciences and subordinated to metaphysi-
cal philosophy (cf. Hentschel 1999, pp. 53-54). The Baroque injects active 
strength and infinite differentiation in it.
The harmony of the Leibnizian universe is articulated, first of all, accord-
ing to numerical relations but, at the same time, it is order resonating like 
music (and here ‘like’ is obtrusively used), displaying the beauty, as well 
as the goodness, of divine choices in an aesthetic, perceptive and physical-
acoustic manner. As said above, no matter how pervasive, the Leibnizian 
evocation of God does not succeed in replacing the joy of the world as it is 
or in rendering it a mere appendix. It is by following this clue that the refer-
ences to musical harmony, especially in a baroque frame, reveal a signifi-
cant qualitative import, in spite of their unobtrusive frequency. One should 
not be surprised at the fact that, for example, Leibniz inserts Instituzioni 
harmoniche (1588), the work by Gioseffo Zarlino, among the necessary 
21 «Similitudo in varietate, seu diversitas identitate compensata» (G.W. Leibniz, The Con-
fession of a Philosopher, [1673?], 116, in Leibniz 2005, pp. 28-29).
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sources – within the class Mathematics – of his project for a Bibliotheca 
Universalis. Zarlino, Maestro of the Saint Mark Chapel in Venice, was a 
supreme authority in the field of musical harmony; Leibniz shows he has a 
direct notion of it and it is plausible to assume that Zarlino’s definition of 
consonance as «dynamic balance», «proportion of movements», «relation 
among opposites: the low- and the high-pitched sounds», has influenced 
the philosopher’s thought. The idea that true harmony must be experi-
enced through the modulation of diversity and be made of the coexistence 
of consonances and dissonances22 is shared in common by this conception 
of music and the Leibnizian reflection on the ills of the world seen as dis-
sonances contributing to the harmony of the universe.23 Harmony is not 
interrupted by dissonances but springs exactly from their combining with 
consonances. This has nothing to do with whatsoever aestheticizing of evil, 
nor is the musical example to be meant as a mere metaphorical illustra-
tion. Evil is not facing us as something that can be isolated and taken to 
Court as material evidence in order to charge God with being unjust. Evil 
has to be known and judged in a larger combinatory network that is not 
immediately perceivable but that makes of it an unavoidable ingredient of 
universal harmony. Dilthey narrates that Leibniz, endowed with a robust 
appetite but having no inclination for physical exercise, became a sufferer 
from gout. In order to put up with pain and be able to walk, he had support-
ing wooden vice fitted on his legs. This was a logistic device that made his 
health worse, fatally shortening his life (cf. Dilthey 1969, p. 30). Well, the 
harmony thought through and philosophically experienced by Leibniz is 
the very opposite of this artificial and extrinsic overlapping of reasoning, 
physical nature and subjective perceptions. Organ music, for example, is a 
wind – physical nature – «blown into properly adjusted pipes» (Théodicée, 
Discours, § 7, GP VI, p. 54), wind harmonized with technical sagacity and 
mathematical congruence.
The Leibnizian musical harmony is made of variations and contrasts. 
The slavish repetition of the same chords, or an excess of regularity and 
uniformity of sounds stifles and fades it away,24 preventing it from being 
22 Cf. Erle 2005, pp. 15-16, 22-26. In Leibniz’s times the court of Hannover cultivated a 
keen interest in music and entertained intense relationships with Venice, a city that, like 
few others, was open to the artistic culture of whole Europe. A significant figure, working 
at the German court, was that of the Venetian Agostino Steffani whose musical talent was 
second only to diplomatic expertise (cf. de’ Grandis 1966, pp. 118, 121-123).
23 «Vices and crimes do not detract from the beauty of the universe, but rather add to 
it, just as certain dissonances would offend the ear by their harshness if they were heard 
quite alone, and yet in combination they render the harmony more pleasing» (Théodicée, 
Remarques sur le Livre de l’origine du mal, § 27, GP VI, p. 434).
24 In Théodicée, § 211 (GP VI, p. 244), Leibniz quotes Horace, Ars poetica, vv. 355-356: «Ut 
citharoedus ridetur chorda qui semper oberrat eadem (in the same way as the citharoedus 
always touching on the same string is laughed at)».
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mirror and staging of the complex truth of the real world.
The sense pleasures that get closest to the pleasures of the mind (de 
l’esprit) […] are those of music and of symmetry (symmetrie), the first 
ones being pleasures for the ears, the latter for the eyes, and it is easy 
to understand the reasons of harmony or of this perfection that gives 
us pleasure. The only thing that can be feared, here, is using it for too 
long. (Grua, 580)
Leibniz’s aversion for the prolonged and monotonous repetition of the 
same is not confined to a wish for novelty or variation, at least whenever 
he can be seen to welcome the complexity of the relations of contrast and 
opposition. The characterization of evil as ‘a dissonance’ is no aestheticiz-
ing digression: it is a philosophical call to the truth of the world made of a 
mobile coexistence and connection of ills and goods, of clashing and soft 
sounds whose contrast is able to metamorphosize itself into a beautiful 
unity begetter of pleasures for the intellect, as well as for the senses. In 
Théodicée, § 124, the airs of Lully’s Cadmus and Hermione are mentioned:
wisdom must vary. To multiply one and the same thing only would be 
superfluity, and poverty too. To have a thousand well-bound Vergils in 
one’s library, always to sing the airs from the opera of Cadmus and 
Hermione, to break all the china in order only to have cups of gold, to 
have only diamond buttons, to eat nothing but partridges, to drink only 
Hungarian or Shiraz wine – would one call that reason? (GP VI, p. 179)
Advancing a critical remark about Jean-Baptiste Lully meant objecting 
against the composer of Tuscan descent consecrated by Louis XIV as an 
authentic art celebrity whose airs were ‘radiant’ just like the court of Roi 
Soleil. In Lully dissonance is not, actually, absent but, nevertheless, it is 
definitely mitigated. In the air ‘La peine d’aimer’, for example, in Cadmus 
and Hermione, he «builds up an idyllic situation» in which falling prey to 
love passion is devoid of any cruelty and danger, deprived as it is of diver-
gences capable of acting as really «dissonant forces» (Erle 2005, pp. 59-
81, 95-99).25 Thus, the truth of Baroque becomes a fable, in the same way 
as Leibniz’s perspective would end up and, finally, ends up appearing like 
the optimistic philosophical tale of those who can see only what they have 
chosen to think. However, a definitely ‘other’ dramatic intensity permeates 
Leibniz’s philosophical vision, one that evokes another great Lutheran, 
almost contemporary Bach.
25 Erle 2005, pp. 69-72 underlines how the aesthetics of baroque rhetoric, centered on a 
harmony animated by real contrasts, is, instead, on the other hand, realized in Monteverdi’s 
Madrigals.
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Nowadays we are tempted to ‘receive’ the Leibnizian representation 
of the universe as a self-referential, logical-theological construction of 
modern and Christian metaphysics. Similarly, we tend to conceive Bach’s 
art of counterpoint as «a closed musical system without reference be-
yond itself», exempt from «‘extra-musical’ assumptions and attitudes». 
Yet, witness above all some of Bach’s amazing chorales, in the first half 
of the eighteenth century «double counterpoint and canon were concrete 
manifestations of the ‘order of God’» and, more specifically, «a way of 
contemplating death and of investigating the hidden connections govern-
ing the universe» (Yearsley 2002, p. XIII, 24). Brought up in the Lutheran 
schola mortis, Bach makes of the canon, or fugue, the sound-unfolding 
of the infinite interweaving and reciprocal passing of the living into the 
dying, of the dying into the living. An interweaving and overlapping that 
does not act through points but through numerical relations and intervals. 
This contrapuntal web is not, therefore, ornament or construction ending 
in themselves, but, on the contrary, is a way of contemplating death, of 
moving towards it along a path paved with musical harmony.
The art of dying did not find in the counterpoint of the chorals an aes-
thetic illustration or a celebratory moment, but the logical-aesthetic ar-
ticulation of the mobile compresence of life and death, of their connecting 
themselves to the whole, of the infinite scale in which, through an infi-
nite counterpoint, consonances and dissonances, pleasure and suffering, 
overlap. Playing, more than composing, this music was a concrete way of 
harmonically thinking and, at the same time, perceiving the destiny as-
signed to men – obviously conceived by a Christian as creatures of God 
called to test their faith in point of death – a way of putting themselves to 
the test of having to die.
The canon exhibited a type of infinity that made of it much more than a 
mere scholastic exercise or a display of musical samplings. Infinite articu-
lation – according to eternal ideal rules26 – of the differentiating of unity, 
the canon imposed itself as sacred music, as «church music» (Yearsley 
2002, p. 52). In the years 1723-24 an exemplary dispute arose between 
Heinrich Bokemeyer and Johann Mattheson. To the latter the canon was 
only an anatomical dissection of the musical rules and only a magic and 
obscurantist approach could pass off this music-to-be-seen on the score 
(Augenmusik or Papiermusik) as authentic music involving the senses and 
26 «Virtues are virtues […] by their nature and by the nature of rational creatures, before 
God decrees to create them. To hold a different opinion would be as if someone were to say 
that the rules of proportion and harmony are arbitrary with regard to musicians because 
they occur in music only when one has resolved to sing or to play some instrument. But that 
is exactly what is meant by being essential to good music: for those rules belong to it already 
in the ideal state, even when none yet thinks of singing, since it is known that they must 
of necessity belong to it as soon as one shall sing» (Théodicée, § 181, GP VI, pp. 222-223).
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manifesting true harmony. On the other hand, Bokemeyer defended «the 
honor of counterpoint», holding that the technical framework of the canon 
is no mere artifice, but, on the contrary, is a logical-musical weaving that 
is really harmonic. In the canon – Bokemeyer insisted – one could contem-
plate «the ‘true essence’ of all other musical forms». Well, Bach is certainly 
in agreement with the latter. Harmony results from following the rules and 
not from the free power of being indifferent to them. Concordia discors, 
the title of canon BWV 1086 (cf. Yearsley 2002, pp. 52-55, 59-60, 68-69, 73, 
97), consists of a mobile and holistic interpenetration of consonances and 
dissonances the logic of which is not at all an empty formal skeleton. Leib-
niz, too,27 would have been on the side of Bokemeyer and Bach. With Bach, 
besides, he also shares the fact of giving the impression of referring musi-
cal harmony back to an occult invisible filigree, like the most oscurantist 
of alchemists. As pointed out before, however, Leibniz is no philosopher of 
the magic or secret causes, but only of the complex reasons that, in order 
for them to be calculated, require patience, capacity to outdistance and to 
penetrate. Similarly, Bach, in entrusting the score of a canon – for istance 
«the so-called Hudemann canon, BWV 1074»  – to «an enigmatic, cryptic 
notation» (Yearsley 2002, pp. 42-44), is not being driven by obscurantist or 
superstitious inclinations, but, instead, by the intent of effectively referring 
to the stratified complexity of cosmic harmony which is rational without 
being immediately and completely exhibited on the surface.
In § 17 of Principles of Nature and Grace Leibniz writes:
Music that we hear can charm us, even though its beauty consists only 
in relations among numbers, and in the way the beats or vibrations of 
the sounding body return to the same frequency at certain intervals. 
(We are not aware of the numbers of these beats, but the soul counts 
them all the same!) Our pleasure in the proportions of things we see 
are of the same kind; and those that the other senses produce will come 
down to something similar, even though we couldn’t explain them so 
straightforwardly. (GP VI, pp. 605-606)
The beauty of music lies in the congruity of numerical relations, and aesthet-
ic pleasure derives from the pleasure for the proportions among things. As 
is remarked in the famous Letter of 17th April 1712 to Christian Goldbach, 
27 The canon was held as a natural matrix from which every musical art derives. Now, it 
would be opportune to wonder which Leibniz’s position is concerning the temperate scale, 
which artificially harmonizes the natural scale by introducing semitones that express ir-
rational numbers. Was Leibniz distrustful of whatever moved away from nature, conceived 
and chosen by God? Or, mathematics and nature being insurmountable, therefore assisted 
music, too, cannot but have been thought, foreseen and chosen by the creator of the uni-
verse? Notwithstanding what I have been maintaining, with respect to the non correctibility 
of the universe, I would lean towards the second hypothesis. 
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in perceiving the beauty of chords our soul is not aware of being counting, 
music is an occult arithmetic exercise: «musica est exercitium arithmeticae 
occultum nescientis se numerare animi».28 When a painful event appears 
to us as an insurmountable objection against the harmony of the world, it 
means that in us the unaware counting of the convenient proportions of the 
whole (within which dissonances are essential) stops resounding. 
May we say that Leibniz’s thought is a musical thought? We could not 
definitely ask the same question with respect to Heidegger. Well, although 
neither the rhythm nor the sound of Essays on Theodicy can be said to 
make them musical, still, it remains plausible to hold that the adjective 
‘musical’ is not here applied at a merely metaphorical level (cf. Bockholdt 
1999, pp. 163-174).
Music is listened to, enjoyed, thought, (unawarely) counted by us. These 
are not levels extrinsically overlapped, though. The pre-established har-
mony is no paratactic juxtaposition based on contiguity. A few years later, 
Kant will propose the image of the concentric circles in order to explain 
the relationship between morality and religion. One may venture to say 
that it could help us understand the coexistence between mathematical 
framework, causal and cognitive weft, physical phenomenicity and sub-
jective perceptive dimension. These are concentric circles that are differ-
entiated ‘only’ by diverse grades of distinction but that are compresent. 
Diverse infinities, variously and endlessly interwined. Of course, to Leibniz 
numerical relations are more decisive than perceptive representations 
but anyway all concur in forming the harmony of the whole. According 
to Leibniz music, as artistic and physical-acoustic articulation offered to 
subjective perceptions and taste, is the clothing of mathematics, not its 
disguise. Counterpoint is arithmetic, even though we perceive of it only 
the sounding mise-en-scène. 
Mathematical rules and arithmetic computation do not deny, nor replace 
our perceptions or aesthetic pleasure. There is a simultaneous unity of 
the components of the universe, which unfolds diachronically, too. Leibniz 
infinitely varies and animates the presence and unity of the real world. 
Baroque music offers exemplary manifestations of it. This is what Deleuze 
has understood earlier and better than others: in Leibniz the diverse does 
not simply divide the ‘cake’ of the universe in slices: here logic and math-
ematics, there aesthetics, there the physical reality objectively known, 
here the subjective representations, where everybody occupies a part of it. 
In Leibniz’s view the harmony of the universe is no mere role-play, on the 
contrary, it is coexistence, actual compossibility of the diverse, even of the 
opposite, where each fabric has got the other within itself. «The manifold, 
28 «Does the pleasure of music arise because we are unaware of calculating, or in spite 
of this unawareness? The correct answer is undoubtedly the second one» (Martinelli 2012, 
2, § 2, p. 72; our transl.).
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then, is not only what has got many parts» (Deleuze 1988, p. 5). The unify-
ing tension animating it engenders the network of diverse orders of the 
infinite. In Leibniz more than one single infinite, rather, infinite infinites 
interweave, cohabiting harmoniously (cf. pp. 5, 23, 40, 61-3, 78). Not only 
are there no fissures, nor discontinuities, but the folds and the curves it 
is made up of allow for that very elasticity and flexibility (cf. pp. 8, 169) 
that preserve unity even in the highest opposing tension. The universe 
unfolds as an interwoven series of labyrinths, the intelligibility of which 
shirks being within easy grasp.
Though seemingly redundant and whimsical, the spirals of the façade 
of a baroque church or the puffs of a baroque dress hide but do not cover. 
They are full of spiritual energy and, so, contribute, in their way, to dis-
play the vibrant complexity of the real, at the same time also pointing to 
its infinite, invisible and multidimensional stratification. Baroque music 
becomes architectural, even urbanistic, like painting (cf. p. 168). The 
world is an immense city in which it is difficult to orient ourselves. It is 
like a contemporary metropolis: a few single areas or a few particular 
circles of people may be well familiar to us, and, however, it appears we 
are allowed to lead ‘our own lives’ autonomously. Still, if we believe that 
even the most proven familiarity can reduce to itself the complexity and 
undisposability of the world, we are done for. We will end up interpret-
ing failures and sufferings as ill-fated exceptions devoid of any sense, 
out of the score of life,29 or, narcisistically, believing that we are victims 
of unjust shortcomings.
The whole is this very world: its complexity is humanly insaturable.
29 Dissonant chords, as much as sorrow, are prepared, and do not come unexpectedly. 
«The whole Leibnizian theory of evil is a method to prepare and solve the dissonances of a 
universal harmony» (Deleuze 1988, pp. 179-180; our transl.).
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